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   1. Introduction
Unlike training for professional degrees such as an MBA, training for a PhD takes an 
amount of time that varies widely across students within a given field.  In the humanities, for 
instance, some students complete the PhD in as little as 5 or 6 years while others take 11 or 12 
years (Ehrenberg et al. 2009). The goal of this paper is to estimate the impact of labor demand 
for new PhD recipients on time to the doctorate.  Within a field the demand for new PhD 
recipients varies from year to year because the number of employers hiring and the number of 
positions available depend on macroeconomic conditions, state budgets, and university priorities 
(Oyer 2006). As a result, two students from the same department seeking jobs in consecutive 
years may face quite different sets of opportunities. 
The absence of a time limit in doctoral education allows doctoral students the opportunity 
to adjust their completion decisions to match the labor market, slowing down when the market is 
weak and speeding up when the market is strong.  If students were free to choose when to go on 
the job market and had accurate information about labor demand, they may be able to improve 
their job prospects by adjusting their completion timing.  However, faculty advisors may push 
students to complete their degrees without regard to labor-market conditions in order to avoid a 
large number of almost-finished PhD students in their department.  It may also be difficult for 
students to obtain an accurate assessment of current labor demand without engaging in a time-
consuming job search. 
Universities have become more concerned in recent years about long time to degree 
(TTD) and high attrition rates in PhD programs (Ehrenberg et al. 2009; Council of Graduate 
Schools 2010; Ostriker et al. 2010).  The extent to which time to degree is influenced by labor 
demand is relevant for institutional policies.  Some institutions set limits on the number of years 
1 
                                                  
  
 
  
that PhD students may receive institutional funding (Ehrenberg et al. 2009).  If labor demand 
affects TTD, institutions with such policies may decide to increase the limits during periods 
when labor demand is weak.  Determining the effect of labor demand on TTD is also important 
so that this effect can be compared to the effects on TTD of other factors.    
Prior research on time to the doctorate has identified a range of potential factors in TTD.  
Tuckman, Coyle, and Bae (1990), based on a review of the literature, outlined a conceptual 
model with five sets of factors: family characteristics, student characteristics, tuition and 
financial support, institutional environment and program characteristics, and market forces 
including labor demand for new PhD recipients.  Empirical studies of TTD in doctoral education 
have addressed the role of the first four sets of factors, but they have not adequately addressed 
the role of labor demand.1  The primary reason for this is the difficulty of measuring labor 
demand.2  Given this difficulty, some studies (e.g., Abedi and Benkin 1987) did not even attempt 
to control for changing market opportunities for doctorates in different fields over time.  Other 
studies (e.g., Ehrenberg and Mavros 1995; Stephan and Ma 2005) used proxies, but these proxies 
do not adequately isolate the demand for new doctorate recipients. 
The primary contribution of this paper is to provide a direct measure of labor demand and 
to use it to estimate the impact of labor demand on TTD.  The measure of labor demand is 
constructed from counts of job vacancies advertised with professional associations.  This paper 
demonstrates that vacancy-based statistics can be constructed by field over a long time period.  
1 Prior empirical studies of TTD include Abedi and Benkin (1987), Tuckman, Coyle, and Bae (1990), Bowen and
Rudenstine (1992), Ehrenberg and Mavros (1995), Espenshade and Rodriguez (1997), Siegfried and Stock (2001), 
Ehrenberg et al. (2007), and Groen et al. (2008).
2 Stephan and Ma (2005, p. 72) remarked: “Measures of the strength of the job market are notoriously difficult to 
construct.” 
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Furthermore, the paper provides evidence that the annual number of job listings in a field is a 
credible measure of labor demand for new PhD recipients.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section presents a conceptual 
framework of student progress towards the PhD and discusses the potential role of variation over 
time in labor demand.  Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis: 
comprehensive student-level data and annual counts of job listings by field from 1975 to 2005 
for seven fields in the humanities and social sciences.  Section 4 presents the empirical approach 
that is used to estimate the impact of labor demand on TTD.  The empirical estimates are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the main findings and some implications. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
To motivate the empirical analysis, this section outlines a conceptual framework for 
understanding how labor demand for new PhDs may affect student progress towards the PhD.  
Prior to discussing the problem at the micro level, it is useful to situate the problem at the macro 
level. Consider the academic labor market in the United States in a particular field (such as 
history or economics) in terms of a standard model of supply and demand.  The demand for labor 
in the field changes over time due to changes in state appropriations, the size of college-going 
cohorts, the demand for undergraduate courses in the field, the performance of university 
endowments, and other factors (Oyer 2006). 
When the demand curve shifts out, the market equilibrium moves along the (short-run) 
supply curve, and both wages and the quantity of labor increase.  The amount that quantity 
increases depends on the elasticity of supply. One component of the supply elasticity is the 
responsiveness of the production of new PhDs to a change in demand.  Given the typical length 
of time from entering a doctoral program to earning a PhD, it is not feasible for new doctoral 
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students to generate an increase in the number of doctorate recipients in the short run in response 
to an increase in demand. 
However, students who are already enrolled in PhD programs and working on their 
dissertations could speed up their progress in order to move more quickly into the labor market.  
At the market level, then, this paper addresses whether the number of PhDs produced in a field 
responds to short-run changes in demand in the academic labor market via completion behavior 
of existing students. The overall elasticity of supply is also affected by the responses of other 
potential suppliers, including doctorate holders who are not currently working, those working in 
the non-academic sector, and those working in other countries (see Ehrenberg 1992). 
At the micro level, the speed at which a student progresses towards the PhD might be 
influenced by a variety of factors.  Some of the factors relate to the student’s institution or 
department, such as funding, course requirements, and advising. Other factors are largely in 
students’ control, including the effort and amount of time they devote to their studies and 
research as compared to outside employment, home production, and leisure activity. 
Students can be expected to influence their degree progress by balancing the costs and 
benefits of additional time spent working on their research.  Chief among the benefits is the 
quality of the dissertation; in turn, a better dissertation may lead to a better job.  Other benefits 
that are productive for students include access to library resources at their universities and access
to advisors, classmates, and others on campus.  Remaining a student rather than finishing the 
PhD also confers several consumption benefits, including on-campus student housing and 
subsidized health insurance. 
The costs of longer TTD include direct financial costs (i.e., tuition and related expenses) 
as well as the opportunity cost of remaining a student.  The opportunity cost reflects the greater 
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expected wage from having a PhD compared to not having a PhD.3  The financial payoff to 
obtaining a PhD in a field is a function of starting salaries for academic positions, the number of
academic positions available, and the availability of nonacademic alternatives.  Beyond 
opportunity costs, longer TTD can be costly by providing a negative signal of individual ability 
or effort. Even in the humanities (a set of fields with long average TTD), degree times longer 
than 8 years are associated with worse job outcomes (Ehrenberg et al. 2009). 
If labor demand for new PhDs influences the speed of student progress, the effect would 
operate primarily through opportunity costs.  An increase in labor demand would raise the 
financial payoff to obtaining a PhD, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of remaining a 
student. This cost can be considered an increasing function of the probability of getting an 
academic job, the starting salary of that job, and the status of that job (e.g., tenure status and type 
of institution).  The increased opportunity cost would be expected to increase the speed of 
student progress and lower TTD. I expect that any effect of labor demand on TTD would 
operate primarily at the dissertation stage of doctoral programs rather than at the coursework 
stage. 
The reasoning above assumes that students have control over their completion date.  
However, students may not be completely free to adjust their completion timing.  Even if 
postponing completion in the face of weak labor demand may be beneficial to individual 
students, their advisors may push them to complete their degrees when they are ready (i.e., 
without regard to labor demand) in order to avoid a large number of almost-finished PhD 
students in their department.  If departments were to postpone the completion of some students 
3 The relationship between opportunity costs and PhD TTD was emphasized in general terms by Breneman (1976)
and Tuckman et al. (1990).  The role of opportunity costs in influencing undergraduate TTD was considered by
Messer and Wolter (2010).
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who are ready to graduate, that would create more competition in the labor market in subsequent 
years for students who become ready to graduate.  As a result, even though student placement is 
important for a department’s reputation, allowing students to adjust their completion timing in 
response to labor-demand shifts might not produce an increase in the average quality of student 
placements. 
Informational issues may also limit the impact of labor demand on TTD.  Even though 
job listings are relatively easy for students to access, what the listings reveal about labor demand 
may not be immediately clear to students.  Obtaining an accurate assessment of current labor 
demand—in a field generally and in a student’s specific area of concentration—may require a 
substantial time commitment in order to apply for positions, arrange for interviews and 
presentations, and learn the specific details of the position associated with each listing.  As a 
result, students might be unwilling to make such a time commitment if they are not close to 
finishing their dissertations.  When students commit the time to a job search and find limited 
opportunities, they may take the best available offer rather than wait until the next hiring cycle. 
3. Data 
3.1. Student Data 
The empirical analysis in the paper is based on microdata on students who received 
doctorates from 1975 to 2008.  These data come from the Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED), a 
census of research doctorates from U.S. universities.  The survey, which is sponsored by the 
National Science Foundation and five other U.S. government agencies, is administered to 
doctorate recipients once they finish their degree requirements.  The response rate is very high 
(usually over 90 percent annually), and basic information for nonrespondents (field of study, 
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degree date, doctorate institution, and gender) is obtained from their degree-granting institutions
and from public records (Hoffer et al. 2006). 
The measure of TTD used in this analysis is the number of years from graduate entry to 
the PhD, where graduate entry is defined as entrance into the first institution after the first 
baccalaureate was earned. Graduate entry would be prior to entry into the program that awarded 
the PhD if a student completed a stand-alone master’s degree before entering the PhD program.  
Although this measure of TTD doesn’t always capture the beginning of PhD study, it does 
capture the end of PhD study, which is the critical endpoint for the empirical approach taken in 
this study of completion timing.  This measure of TTD is the best one available in the SED for 
the time period of the study.  An alternative measure of TTD, starting from entry into a PhD 
program, is conceptually more appropriate but is available in the SED only for individuals who 
completed the PhD in 1993 or later. 
In addition to TTD, several other variables are created from the student responses to the 
SED. Financial aid received by students is summarized by the primary source of support during 
graduate school.  Information on each student’s institution, field, and year of graduate entry are 
used to assign a rank and size of the doctoral program, based on the 1981 and 1993 National 
Research Council assessments (see the Appendix for details).  Also available from the SED are 
standard demographic variables (age, gender, and race/ethnicity) along with citizenship.  
Unfortunately, the SED data do not include a measure of student ability such as test scores.  As a 
proxy for student ability, I use admissions selectivity of each student’s bachelor’s institution in 
one part of the analysis. 
The SED sample used in this paper covers seven fields in the humanities and social
sciences: anthropology, classics, economics, English, history, philosophy, and political science.  
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These fields were chosen because the time-series data on job listings were available and because 
the fields are in related disciplines.  The fields represent 51.8 percent of all doctorates awarded in 
the humanities and social sciences from 1975 to 2008.  Table 1 summarizes the personal 
characteristics of doctorate recipients in these fields.  Table 2 summarizes the distribution of 
TTD by field. Median TTD is highest in anthropology and lowest in economics.  In each field 
the mean TTD exceeds the median, reflecting the long right tail of the distribution.  Within fields 
there is substantial variation in TTD across students, with a difference of 5 years between the 
25th and 75th percentiles being typical. 
3.2. Job Listings 
I measure labor demand for new PhD recipients using the annual number of job listings 
in each field.  I collected these data from a professional association for each of the seven fields 
(see the Appendix for details). Each association serves a vital organizing role in the labor market 
for doctorate recipients in a discipline by publishing listings (advertisements) of job vacancies.  
Field-specific job listings are conceptually a better measure of the demand for labor in a 
particular field than general measures such as the unemployment rate and the help-wanted 
index.4  In addition, job listings are a more direct measure of labor demand than the proxy 
variables used in the literature on TTD and the academic labor market.  For example, Ehrenberg 
and Mavros (1995) used the mean starting salary for new assistant professors in a field and 
Stephan and Ma (2005) used the percentage change in total current-fund revenue of public 
institutions. 
4 The unemployment rate has been used as a measure of labor demand in studies of cohort effects for college 
graduates (Kahn 2010; Oreopolous, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012).  The help-wanted index has been used as a 
proxy for job vacancies in numerous studies (e.g., Shimer 2005). 
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Despite their appeal at a conceptual level, counts of listings in disciplinary employment 
services may not be a perfect measure of the labor demand for new doctorate recipients, for 
several reasons.  First, these counts typically include listings for positions of all ranks, including 
positions for full professors as well as those for assistant professors.  Second, a given listing may 
be published multiple times (for instance, in consecutive months), and in some cases the annual 
total number of listings that is available includes only new listings whereas in other cases the 
total includes both new and repeat listings.  Third, a given listing can advertise multiple 
vacancies; in some cases the figure that I collected is the total number of listings whereas in 
others the figure is the total number of vacancies.  Because for most fields I had access to 
summary tabulations rather than the individual listings, I had to accept differences across fields 
in definitions. However, in the measures I chose or constructed I was able to achieve 
consistency over time within each field. 
Another potential concern is that some types of jobs that are of interest to new doctorate 
recipients in a given field may not be well represented in the listings.  In particular, the job 
listings may disproportionately represent academic jobs.  Almost all academic vacancies should 
be included in the listings, but some non-academic vacancies may not be included in the 
listings.5  However, almost three-fourths (74 percent) of graduates in these fields (combined) 
went into academic employment after graduation.6  Furthermore, in economics—the field with 
5 I expect that nearly all academic vacancies are included in these listings in order to comply with university anti-
discrimination provisions and to satisfy the professional obligation to advertise open positions.  For example, the 
Ethics Guide of the American Political Science Association (APSA) reads: “It is a professional obligation of all 
political science departments to list in the APSA Personnel Service Newsletter all positions for which they are 
recruiting at the Instructor, Assistant, and Associate Professor levels.  In addition, the listing of openings at the Full 
Professor level is strongly encouraged.  It is also a professional obligation for departments to list temporary and 
visiting positions” (quoted in Brintnall 2005). 
6 The share of graduates going into academic employment by field (among those with definite plans at the time of 
graduation): anthropology (60%), classics (88%), economics (61%), English (81%), history (76%), philosophy
(83%), and political science (76%) [author’s calculations from SED data for 1975–2005 doctorate recipients].
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the largest share of graduates going into non-academic employment—the number of non-
academic listings is highly correlated with the number of academic listings over the period 1975-
2005 (correlation coefficient: 0.79). Thus, even if the job listings disproportionately represent 
academic jobs, the number of listings may still be an adequate measure of labor demand overall 
(including non-academic vacancies).
The time-series data on job listings is presented in Figure 1.  Panel A shows the annual 
number of job listings by field.  Panel B normalizes the number of job listings by the field-
specific average over 1984–2002 (the period over which listings are available for all fields); the 
scale is set so that the field-specific average is 10.  Panel B indicates that time-series trends are 
similar across fields.  The raw correlation between any two fields in the normalized listings 
ranges from 0.34 to 0.92.  The standard deviation of normalized listings varies across fields from
1.72 to 3.21 with an average of 2.07. The number of job listings in a given field is similar in 
consecutive years, with a correlation coefficient in normalized listings of 0.83.  I use the 
normalized measure of job listings in the empirical analysis because it isolates the variation over 
time within a field and because it makes fields comparable regardless of size.
Given the measurement concerns, I provide two pieces of evidence that the number of job 
listings is a credible measure of the labor demand for new doctorate recipients.  First, job listings
are correlated with fiscal variables that are plausibly related to labor demand.  As shown in Table 
3, variation over time in job listings is correlated with the national unemployment rate 
(negatively), state appropriations per student at public universities (positively), expenditures per 
student at public universities (positively), and faculty salaries (positively).  When faculty salaries 
are examined by rank, salaries of junior faculty (assistant professor, instructor, and lecturer) and 
10 
   
                                                 
 
salaries of senior faculty (associate professor and full professor) are positively correlated with 
the number of job listings. 
Second, job listings are positively correlated with job outcomes of new PhD recipients.7 
To measure the job outcomes of new PhD recipients, I use their responses to questions in the 
SED regarding postgraduation plans. The survey asks whether a graduate has made a definite 
commitment for work or further training (such as a postdoctoral position) and (for those with a 
definite commitment) the type of employer.  From the responses I construct indicator variables 
for four job outcomes: (1) work/training with any employer, (2) work/training with a U.S. 
employer, (3) work/training with an academic employer, and (4) work/training with a U.S. 
academic employer.  I estimate a set of regressions in which a given indicator variable is a 
function of the number of job listings in the year of completion and controls for field, rank and 
size of the doctoral program, TTD, and demographic characteristics. 
As shown in Table 4, the estimated coefficient on job listings is positive and statistically 
significant in the regression for each job outcome.  For the first outcome, the estimated 
coefficient implies that an increase in job listings of 10 percent increases the share of graduates 
having work/training with any employer by 1.2 percentage points.  The estimated coefficients for 
the other three outcomes—which focus on specific segments of the market—are qualitatively 
similar (ranging from 1.0 to 1.2).  Taken together, the evidence in Table 3 and Table 4 indicates 
that the number of job listings is a credible measure of labor demand for new doctorate 
recipients. 
7 In related evidence, Oyer (2006) showed that the number of academic job listings in economics at the time of 
completion is correlated with the quality of initial placement. 
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4. Empirical Approach 
4.1. Econometric Model
I use a duration model to estimate the impact of labor demand on TTD.  A duration 
model is appropriate because we are considering factors associated with the timing of an event 
(namely, completing a doctoral program).  Because the counts of job listings are constructed on 
an annual basis, I use a discrete-time model.  For each graduate, I use the SED data to determine 
the academic year of entry to graduate school (ݐ௘) and the academic year of the PhD (ݐ௣).8  Then 
I compute TTD as the number of academic years between entry and completion (ݐ௣ െ ݐ௘ ൅ 1). 
As discussed by Jenkins (1995) and Singer and Willett (1993), discrete-time duration models are 
convenient to specify (they accommodate both time-varying and fixed covariates) and easy to 
estimate with standard statistical packages.9  Following their advice, I arrange the student data 
with one observation per (academic) year for each student.  These data are then matched by year 
and field to the number of job listings. 
For a student in field ݂ who enters graduate school in academic year ݐ଴௜, I specify the 
probability of completing the PhD in Year ݐ of the program (if the student has not yet graduated) 
as a function of time-varying and fixed covariates using the logistic form: 
ߣሺݐ଴௜, ݐሻ ൌ ୣ୶୮	ሾ௬ ሿଵାୣ୶୮	ሾ௬೔
ሺ
೔
௧
ሺ
బ೔
௧బ೔
,௧
,௧
ሻ 
ሻሿ , where ݕ௜ሺݐ଴௜, ݐሻ ൌ ߠ  ൅ ߰௧ ൅ ߛ′ ௜ܺ ൅ ߚ ௙ܼሺݐ଴௜ ൅ ݐ  െ 1ሻ. (1) 
In this equation, ߠ is a constant; ߰௧ is a fixed effect for Year ݐ of the program; ௜ܺ is a vector of 
time-invariant student and program characteristics; and ௙ܼሺݐ଴௜ ൅ ݐ െ 1ሻ is the number of job 
listings for field ݂ in academic year ݐ଴௜ ൅ ݐ െ 1, when the student was in Year ݐ of the program. 
8 As noted in the Appendix, academic years are defined for this analysis as going from August of one calendar year
through July of the following calendar year.  For defining the academic year of PhDs, I assign PhDs awarded in the 
fall (August through December) to the prior academic year because in these cases students have typically completed 
the degree requirements by the end of July. 
9 Another paper that uses a discrete-time duration model is Ham and Rea (1987).
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The estimation sample contains students who graduated between 1975 and 2008 and who 
had TTD between 4 and 15 years. Each student contributes one observation for each academic 
year spent in the program, starting with Year 4.  I don’t include observations for Years 1–3 
because the probability of completion in these years is essentially zero.  An implication of this 
restriction is that the estimated effect of labor demand is based primarily on the dissertation stage 
of doctoral programs.  This is sensible because labor demand is likely to have little influence on 
student progress during the coursework stage. 
I match the student data to the data on job listings by field and academic year, which are 
available for 1975–2005 or a portion of this period for some fields.  After the match, some
student-year observations have missing data on job listings; for example, a philosophy student 
who entered in 1998 and graduated in 2005 would have missing data on job listings for academic 
years 2003–2005 because the time series of philosophy job listings ends in 2002.  To be included 
in the estimation sample, I require that students have data on jobs listings for their fourth year; 
for later years, student-year observations with missing data on job listings are dropped from the 
sample.  As a result, some students (2.3 percent) in the estimation sample have incomplete spells; 
most (97.7 percent) have completed spells. 
For the completed spells, we observe graduation in academic year ݐ଴௜ ൅ ݐ௜∗ െ 1; thus, 
∗ TTD is ݐ௜  years.  The probability of the completed spell is 
௧೔∗ିଵ݃௜ሺݐ଴௜, ݐ௜∗ሻ ൌ ቄ∏௧ୀସ ሾ1 െ ߣ௜ሺݐ଴௜, ݐሻሿቅ ߣ௜ሺݐ଴௜, ݐ௜∗ሻ. (2) 
For the incomplete spells, TTD is right censored at ݐ௜̅ (i.e., we know only that TTD exceeds ݐ௜̅). 
The contribution to the likelihood function for these cases is 
ሾ1 െ ܩሺݐ଴௜, ݐ̅ ሻሿ ൌ ∏௧̅೔ ሾ1 െ ߣ  . (3)௜ ௧ୀସ ௜ሺݐ଴௜, ݐሻሿ 
The likelihood function is then 
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ܮ ൌ  ∏௜∈஼ ݃௜ሺݐ଴௜, ݐ௜∗ሻ∏௜∈ூேሾ1 െ ܩሺݐ଴௜, ݐ௜̅ ሻሿ, (4) 
where ܥ denotes completed spells and ܫܰ denotes incomplete spells.  Parameter estimates are 
obtained by maximizing ܮ with respect to the parameters.  This is done by estimating a logit 
regression model with the dependent variable equal to 1 for the year the student graduates and 
equal to 0 for other years.  Because the measure of job listings does not vary across student-year 
observations in the same year and field, I compute standard errors that allow for correlation in 
the error term within cells defined by year and field. 
To translate the coefficient estimates into effects on TTD, I compute the marginal effect 
of job listings on expected TTD. Given the parameter estimates, expected TTD is 
ଵହܧሺܶܶܦሻ ൌ ∑௧ୀସ ݐ ∙  ݃ ሺݐ଴, ݐሻ. (5) 
For this calculation, I set the ܺ variables at their mean values.  The effect of changing labor 
demand on expected TTD is obtained by numerically differentiating this equation with respect to 
the number of job listings.  The interpretation of this effect is how expected TTD would respond 
to a permanent increase in the number of job listings. 
4.2. Implementation 
Due to the requirement that sample members have completed a PhD by 2008, the 
completion hazard is artificially high for the years leading up to 2008.  As a result, the time trend 
in the completion hazard involves a form of selection bias.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, which 
plots (using the solid lines) the completion hazard over time separately for students in the 5th, 
7th, and 9th years of their doctoral programs.  For Year 5, for example, the completion hazard 
increases sharply after 2001.  The reason is that the composition of the sample changes over 
time, with the sample in later years having a shorter average TTD.  In 2005, for instance, the 
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sample of students in Year 5 is those with TTD of 8 years or less.  By contrast, the sample of 
students in Year 5 for 2002 is those with TTD of 11 years or less. 
For Year 5, the first year that is subject to selection bias is 1999 because the sample for 
that year is students with TTD of 14 years or less.  The first year that is subject to selection bias 
varies by year in program—a pattern that is evident in Figure 2.  Generically, for Year ܺ, the last
year that is not subject to selection bias is 2008 െ ሺ15 െ ܺሻ; this is 1998 for Year 5, 2000 for 
Year 7, and 2002 for Year 9. 
I use two approaches to eliminate selection bias from the estimates.  The first approach is 
to remove from the estimation sample the student-year observations in cells that are subject to 
selection bias. The second approach is to group the student-year observations into cells defined 
by field ሺ݂ሻ, academic year ሺݕሻ, and year in program ሺܺሻ and adjust the cells that are subject to 
selection bias.  Specifically, for each cell I compute the completion rate and multiply it by 
Pr	ሺܶܶܦ ൑ ܼ|݂; ܺ ሻ, where ܼ ൌ ܺ ൅ ሺ2008 െ ݕሻ. For Year 5, for example, the factors are 
Prሺܶܶܦ ൑ 8ሻ for 2005 and Prሺܶܶܦ ൑ 11ሻ for 2002. The adjustment factors are estimated using 
the student-year observations in cells that are not subject to selection bias.  This multiplicative 
adjustment removes the selection bias by converting the completion rate for the cell from one for 
the observed sample (those who finish by 2008) to one for all students with TTD of 15 years or 
less (including those who finish after 2008). As illustrated in Figure 2 (with the dashed lines), 
this adjustment removes the steep upward trend in the completion hazards at the end of the 
sample period. 
The first approach, because it retains the student-level detail in the estimation sample, has 
the advantage of allowing controls for individual characteristics such as demographics and 
financial support. A disadvantage of this approach is that, by discarding observations in cells 
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subject to selection bias, it reduces coverage of the years at the end of the sample period.  The 
second approach, by contrast, covers the entire sample period.  But because it requires collapsing 
the data into cells, estimation under this approach does not allow for individual-level controls. 
In both the student-level model and group-level model, the key explanatory variable is 
the number of job listings relative to the field-specific mean (scaled so that the field-specific 
average is 10). The other time-varying explanatory variables are year-in-program indicators 
(single years 4–13 and years 14 and 15 combined).  Both models include controls for field.  The 
student-level model includes additional time-invariant explanatory variables: gender, 
citizenship/race, age at graduate entry, primary source of support, and rank and size of the 
doctoral program.10  I do not include primary source of support in the baseline student-level 
model because support might be endogenous to labor demand, but I include it in another 
specification as a robustness check. 
The dependent variable in the student-level model is a binary variable indicating whether 
the student completed the PhD in the year of the observation.  In the group-level model, by 
contrast, the dependent variable is the completion rate in the year for the cell (i.e., the proportion 
of students in the cell who completed the PhD in the year).  As a result, for the group-level 
model a linear specification is used instead of the logit specification that is used for the student-
level model.  Given the differences in dependent variable and functional form, the coefficients 
for the student-level and group-level models are not comparable.  However, the marginal effects 
of job listings on expected TTD are constructed to be comparable: In both models, the marginal 
effects are for an increase in job listings of 10 percent.  In order to produce results that are 
10 Although program rank and size can vary over time for a given department, they are considered time-invariant
explanatory variables because of how they are assigned to students (see the Appendix).
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comparable to those from the student-level model, the group-level regressions are weighted by 
the number of students in each cell.
5. Results 
5.1. Main Results 
Table 5 presents the estimated effects of job listings in regressions that adjust for 
selection. In both the student-level model and the group-level model, the estimates indicate that 
the number of job listings is not correlated with the probability of completion and expected TTD.  
The first column of the table presents the results from my preferred version of the student-level 
model, which includes individual-level controls. In this model, the estimated coefficient on job 
listings is not significantly different from zero and the estimated marginal effect of an increase in 
job listings of 10 percent is close to zero (-0.007 year).  In the group-level model (shown in the 
third column), the estimated marginal effect is also close to zero (-0.005 year). 
To facilitate another comparison of the student-level and group-level models, the second 
column of the table reports results from an alternative version of the student-level model that 
does not include the individual-level controls.  In this version, the estimated marginal effect is 
also close to zero (0.005 year). Summarizing, the three specifications reported in Table 5 have a 
consistent finding: labor demand (as measured by the number of job listings) is not correlated 
with the probability of completion and expected TTD. 
Table 6 presents estimates separately by field.  I compute these estimates by replacing the 
job-listings variable in the baseline specification with a full set of interactions between job 
listings and field indicators. These estimates are presented for the student-level and group-level 
models that adjust for selection. Consistent with the overall results, the estimated coefficient on 
job listings is not significantly different from zero in both models for three fields (anthropology, 
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 classics, and philosophy). History is the only field for which the estimated coefficient on job 
listings is statistically significant and the same sign in both models.  For this field, the estimated 
marginal effect of an increase in job listings of 10 percent is a decrease in expected TTD of 
0.040 year (in the group-level model) or 0.087 year (in the student-level model). 
5.2. Adjusting for Selection 
Table 7 shows the importance of adjusting for selection in estimating the effect of job 
listings on TTD.  The table includes results from regressions that do not adjust for selection 
alongside those from regressions (those reported in Table 5) that adjust for selection.  In both the 
student-level model and group-level model, adjusting for selection has a large impact on the 
results. In the student-level model without adjusting for selection, the estimated coefficient on 
job listings is positive and statistically significant, and the estimated marginal effect of an 
increase in job listings of 10 percent is a decrease in expected TTD of 0.068 year (about 0.82 
month). Adjusting for selection reduces the magnitude of the estimated coefficient so that it is 
no longer statistically significant and the estimated marginal effect is close to zero (-0.007 year).  
The pattern of results is similar in the group-level model, with the selection adjustment reducing 
the estimated marginal effect from -0.061 year to -0.005 year. 
Comparing the results from specifications with and without the adjustment for selection 
suggests that selection bias creates the apparent association between job listings and expected 
TTD in the specifications without the adjustment.  The role of selection bias in this association is 
driven by artificially large completion hazards over the final 8 years of the sample period (see 
Figure 2), when job listings were above their historical average in most fields (see Figure 1).  
Once we adjust for selection, the estimated effect of job listings on expected TTD is essentially 
zero. 
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 5.3. Robustness Checks 
This section reports the results of several robustness checks that largely validate the main 
results. Table 8 presents the results of specifications involving lags and leads in the effect of job 
listings. For these specifications, I replace the variable for the number of job listings in the 
current year with a variable for the number of job listings in a prior year (for the lag 
specifications) or a future year (for the lead specifications).  I continue to use the student-level 
and group-level models that adjust for selection.   
The lag specifications do not contain much evidence of delayed effects of labor demand 
on completion timing: The estimated coefficient of lagged job listings is not significantly 
different from zero in five of the six results (three lags each for the student-level and group-level 
models). The only instance in which lagged job listings is statistically significant is the third lag 
in the group-level model. 
The lead specifications are relevant for detecting problems with identification.  If the 
specification is correct, the probability of completion in year ݐ should not be “determined” by job 
listings in year ݐ ൅ 1. This holds in five of the six results (three leads for each model type): The 
estimated coefficient on the lead of job listings is not significantly different from zero.  The 
exception is the third lead of job listings in the student-level model. 
The next set of robustness checks address concerns about omitted-variables bias.  As 
discussed in Section 4.2, the baseline (student-level) model includes controls for demographics 
but does not include controls for financial support or student quality.  The estimates reported in 
Table 9 demonstrate that including controls for financial support and student quality does not 
change the main results.  Columns 2 and 3 address the impact of adding a control for primary 
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source of support to the student-level model.11  With or without source of support as a control, 
the estimated marginal effect of job listings on expected TTD is not significantly different from
zero. The estimated effects of source of support on the probability of completion are in the 
expected direction: Compared with using personal funds, each of the major sources of support 
(teaching assistantship, research assistantship, and fellowship) is associated with a higher 
probability of completion (shorter TTD). 
As a proxy for student ability, I use a measure of the admissions selectivity of each 
student’s bachelor’s (BA) institution.  This measure comes from Barron’s Profiles of American 
Colleges (1992) and is available for students who received their BA degrees from a U.S. 
institution (78 percent of the students in my sample).  The Barron’s guide groups institutions into 
categories based on the degree of competitiveness in their admissions, ranging from “most 
competitive” to “noncompetitive.”  This proxy for student ability captures peer quality at the 
undergraduate level in addition to admissions selectivity per se. 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 9 show the results of including this proxy for student ability in 
the student-level model estimated on the sample of students who received their BA from a U.S. 
institution. Adding BA selectivity results in little change in the estimated effect of job listings: 
With or without BA selectivity as a control, the estimated marginal effect of job listings on 
expected TTD is not significantly different from zero.  The effects of BA selectivity on 
completion are in the expected direction: The probability of completion is higher (TTD is lower) 
for students who attended more-selective BA institutions.  Finally, the specification reported in 
column 6 includes controls for both BA selectivity and primary source of support.  As with the 
11 The sample used for these specifications is somewhat smaller than the full sample because primary source of 
support was collected in the SED starting with doctorates awarded in 1977. 
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other specifications that include these controls, the estimated effect of job listings on expected 
TTD is not significantly different from zero. 
6. Conclusion
The main finding from the empirical analysis is that labor demand (as measured by the 
number of job listings) is not correlated with the probability of completion and expected TTD.  
There are several potential reasons for the absence of a relationship.  First, students may not be 
completely free to adjust their completion timing.  Their advisors may push them to complete 
their degrees when they are ready (i.e., without regard to labor demand) in order to avoid a large 
number of almost-finished PhD students in their department.  Second, even though job listings 
are relatively easy for students to access, what the listings reveal about labor demand may not be 
immediately clear to students.  Obtaining an accurate assessment of current labor demand may 
require a substantial time commitment, and students might be unwilling to make such a time 
commitment if they are not close to finishing their dissertations.  Third, the absence of a 
relationship may be due to measurement error in job listings as a measure of labor demand for 
new doctorate recipients. Although I cannot rule out measurement error, the evidence presented 
in Section 3.2 indicates that the annual number of job listings in a field is a credible measure of 
labor demand. 
The evidence presented here implies that cyclical variation in labor demand in the 
academic labor market is not responsible for changes over time in TTD within fields.  The 
evidence is also relevant for institutional policies that set limits on the number of years that PhD 
students may receive institutional funding.  The results here imply that there is no empirical basis 
for adjusting those limits based on the current level of labor demand.  Institutions concerned 
about long TTD in PhD programs can consider a range of factors including program
21 
  
characteristics, financial support, and student composition, following the findings of earlier 
research on TTD and completion rates (e.g., Ehrenberg and Mavros 1995; Ehrenberg et al. 2007; 
Groen et al. 2008). 
The findings from this analysis also carry an implication regarding the responsiveness of 
academic labor markets to short-run changes in demand.  The finding that an increase in labor 
demand is not associated with an increase in the probability of completion implies that the 
completion behavior of existing students does not contribute to the overall short-run elasticity of 
supply in the labor market for humanities and social-science doctorates.  Instead, the supply 
elasticity must reflect only the responses of doctorate holders who are not currently working, 
those working in the non-academic sector, and those working in other countries.
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Figure 1. Job Listings by Field, 1975–2005 
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Figure 2. Adjustment for Selection 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Doctorate Recipients, 1975–2008 
Median Mean 
Characteristic Percent TTD TTD 
Gender 
Men 62.12 8.67 9.95 
Women 37.88 9.26 10.88 
Citizenship/Race 
Non–U.S. citizen 21.82 8.42 9.31 
U.S. citizen, non-white 8.12 9.25 10.80 
U.S. citizen, white 68.54 8.92 10.56 
Missing 1.52 8.67 10.04 
Primary Source of Support 
Teaching assistantship 29.61 8.25 9.22 
Research assistantship 4.90 7.67 8.57 
Fellowship 22.76 7.92 9.03 
Personal funds 29.86 10.76 12.56 
Other source 3.54 9.67 11.16 
Missing 9.33 9.67 11.01 
Age at Graduate Entry
21 or younger 7.32 9.67 11.48 
22 26.11 8.67 10.20 
23 18.90 8.67 10.06 
24 12.86 8.75 10.05 
25 8.78 8.92 10.23 
26 6.38 8.92 10.22 
27 4.37 9.09 10.27 
28 to 29 5.38 9.25 10.43 
30 to 33 5.05 9.34 10.59 
34 or older 4.84 9.50 10.36 
Total 100.00 8.92 10.30 
Notes: N=119,961. Tabulation covers doctorate recipients in seven fields: anthropology, 
classics, economics, English, history, philosophy, and political science.  Tabulation of financial 
support is based on 1977–2008 because primary source of support was not requested by the 
survey prior to 1977. 
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Table 2. Time to Degree by Field, 1975–2008 Doctorate Recipients 
25th 75th 75th 
Field Median Mean %ilea %ilea – 25th N N/year 
Anthropology 9.76 11.12 7.67 12.92 5.25 13,168 387.3 
Classics 8.34 9.87 6.67 11.34 4.67 1,916 56.4 
Economics 7.25 8.37 5.67 9.92 4.25 26,711 785.6 
English 9.67 11.11 7.25 12.93 5.68 27,537 809.9 
History 9.75 11.37 7.67 13.26 5.59 25,018 735.8 
Philosophy 8.67 10.04 6.67 11.67 5.00 9,407 276.7 
Political science 8.75 10.01 6.67 11.76 5.09 16,204 476.6 
aPercentile.
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Table 3. Correlation of Job Listings with Fiscal Variables, 1975–2005 
Fiscal variable Mean Coeff. S.E. R2 N 
Unemployment rate 6.12 -0.872* 0.161 0.33 185 
State appropriations per studenta 6.37 2.221* 0.360 0.38 147 
College expenditures per studenta 10.96 0.246* 0.071 0.16 147 
Faculty salariesa 
All faculty 62.45 0.272* 0.066 0.28 152 
Full professor 82.81 0.205* 0.039 0.37 152 
Associate professor 61.39 0.318* 0.070 0.32 152 
Assistant professor 50.84 0.343* 0.078 0.32 152 
Instructor 41.93 0.207* 0.038 0.35 152 
Lecturer 44.15 0.621* 0.152 0.33 152 
Notes: Each row comes from a separate regression of the number of job listings (mean = 10.0) on 
the fiscal variable and a set of indicators for field.  The unit of observation is a field-year.  
Standard errors account for clustering by year.  See the Appendix for details on the fiscal 
variables. 
aIn thousands of dollars. 
*p < .05 
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Table 4. Predicting Job Outcomes of New Doctorate Recipients, 1975–2005 
Coeff. 
on Job 
Job outcome
Work/training with any employer 
Work/training with U.S. employer 
Work/training with academic employer 
Work/training with U.S. academic employer 
Mean 
65.35 
57.01 
48.46 
43.09 
Listings 
1.201* 
(0.134) 
1.214* 
(0.147) 
0.998* 
(0.165) 
1.029* 
(0.164) 
Notes: Each row comes from a separate regression of the job outcome (an indicator multiplied by 
100) on the number of job listings (mean=10.0), field, program rank, program size, TTD (15 
categories), gender, citizenship/race, and age at PhD completion (8 categories).  Sample size for 
each regression: 94,976 students.  Standard errors (in parentheses) account for clustering by year 
and field. 
*p < .05 
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Table 5. Effect of Job Listings on Completion Probabilities and Expected TTD 
Level Student Student Group 
Adjust for selection Yes Yes Yes 
Individual controls Yes No No 
Coefficient 0.0034 -0.0025 0.0002 
Standard error (0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0005) 
Marginal effect [-0.0071] [0.0053] [-0.0046] 
N 361,838 361,838 1,755 
Students 60,739 60,739 — 
Notes: Each column comes from a separate regression.  All regressions include controls for field 
and year in program.  Student-level regressions also include controls for program rank, program
size, gender, race/citizenship, and age at graduate entry (10 categories).  Standard errors account 
for clustering by year and field. Marginal effects on expected TTD are for an increase in job 
listings of 10 percent. The unit of observation for the student-level regressions is a student-year; 
the unit of observation for the group-level regressions is a cell defined by field, academic year, 
and year in program. 
*p < .05 
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Table 6. Effect of Job Listings by Field 
Level Student Group 
Adjust for selection Yes Yes 
Individual controls Yes No 
Anthropology 0.0139 -0.0009 
(0.0137) (0.0011) 
[-0.0287] [0.0182] 
Classics 0.0023 -0.0036 
(0.0235) (0.0029) 
[-0.0048] [0.0881] 
Economics -0.0277* 0.0003 
(0.0128) (0.0012) 
[0.0580] [-0.0058] 
English -0.0236 -0.0027* 
(0.0132) (0.0012) 
[0.0497] [0.0635] 
History 0.0460* 0.0022* 
(0.0083) (0.0007) 
[-0.0870] [-0.0399] 
Philosophy 0.0199 0.0004 
(0.0110) (0.0007) 
[-0.0405] [-0.0083] 
Political science 0.0106 0.0014* 
(0.0069) (0.0006) 
[-0.0219] [-0.0257] 
Notes: Each column comes from a separate regression.  Both regressions include controls for 
field and year in program. Student-level regressions also include controls for program rank, 
program size, gender, race/citizenship, and age at graduate entry (10 categories).  Standard errors 
(in parentheses) account for clustering by year and field.  Marginal effects on expected TTD (in 
brackets) are for an increase in job listings of 10 percent. 
*p < .05 
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Table 7. Effect of Adjusting for Selection on the Estimated Effect of Job Listings 
Level Student Student Student Group Group 
Adjust for selection No Yes Yes No Yes 
Individual controls Yes Yes No No No 
Coefficient 0.0327* 0.0034 -0.0025 0.0031* 0.0002 
Standard error (0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
Marginal effect [-0.0681] [-0.0071] [0.0053] [-0.0614] [-0.0046] 
N 434,749 361,838 361,838 1,755 1,755 
Students 79,729 60,739 60,739 — —
Notes: Each column comes from a separate regression.  All regressions include controls for field 
and year in program.  Student-level regressions also include controls for program rank, program
size, gender, race/citizenship, and age at graduate entry (10 categories).  Standard errors account 
for clustering by year and field. Marginal effects on expected TTD are for an increase in job 
listings of 10 percent. The unit of observation for the student-level regressions is a student-year; 
the unit of observation for the group-level regressions is a cell defined by field, academic year, 
and year in program. 
*p < .05 
35 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Lags and Leads in the Effect of Job Listings 
Level 
Adjust for selection
Individual controls 
Student 
Yes 
Yes 
Group 
Yes 
No 
Lag: t-1 
Lag: t-2 
Lag: t-3 
Lead: t+1 
-0.0026 
(0.0062) 
[0.0054] 
-0.0041 
(0.0063) 
[0.0085] 
0.0040 
(0.0063) 
[-0.0082] 
0.0076 
-0.0001 
(0.0005) 
[0.0019] 
0.0001 
(0.0005) 
[-0.0013] 
0.0013* 
(0.0005) 
[-0.0258] 
0.0004 
Lead: t+2 
(0.0067) 
[-0.0160] 
0.0105 
(0.0005) 
[-0.0077] 
0.0004 
Lead: t+3 
(0.0061) 
[-0.0220] 
0.0145* 
(0.0005) 
[-0.0087] 
0.0005 
(0.0060) 
[-0.0305] 
(0.0005) 
[-0.0106] 
Notes: Each cell comes from a separate regression.  All regressions include controls for field and 
year in program.  Student-level regressions also include controls for program rank, program size, 
gender, race/citizenship, and age at graduate entry (10 categories).  Standard errors (in 
parentheses) account for clustering by year and field.  Marginal effects on expected TTD (in 
brackets) are for an increase in job listings of 10 percent. 
*p < .05 
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Table 9. Controlling for Financial Support and Student Quality 
BA from U.S. Institution 
All PhD 1977–2008 & PhD 1977–2008
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Job listings 0.0034 0.0025 -0.0035 0.0109 0.0098 0.0033
 (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0071) (0.0065)
 [-0.0071] [-0.0052] [0.0073] [-0.0221] [-0.0200] [-0.0066] 
Teaching assistantship  0.3483* 0.3754*
 (0.0189) (0.0199)
Research assistantship  0.4292* 0.4813*
 (0.0310) (0.0357)
Fellowship  0.3570* 0.3932*
 (0.0264) (0.0276)
Personal funds — — 
BA: Most competitive — — 
BA: Highly competitive  -0.1005* -0.0927*
 (0.0193) (0.0194)
BA: Very competitive  -0.1415* -0.1199*
 (0.0194) (0.0189)
BA: Competitive  -0.1906* -0.1754*
 (0.0188) (0.0179)
BA: Less competitive or  -0.1891* -0.1675*
noncompetitive   (0.0245) (0.0234)
BA: Unranked  -0.3844* -0.3307*
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.128 0.131 0.133
 (0.0515)
 0.134
(0.0514)
0.138
N 361,838 361,411 361,411 283,694 283,694 283,694
Students 60,739 60,467 60,467 47,571 47,571 47,571 
Mean TTD 8.84 8.86 8.86 8.85 8.85 8.85
Notes: All regressions are from student-level models that adjust for selection and include 
controls for field, year in program, program rank, program size, gender, race/citizenship, and age 
at graduate entry (10 categories). Standard errors (in parentheses) account for clustering by year 
and field. Marginal effects on expected TTD (in brackets) are for an increase in job listings of 
10 percent. The unit of observation is a student-year. 
*p < .05 
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Appendix: Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Definition of academic year.  Unless otherwise noted, a “year” is an academic year.  
Academic year ݐ is defined as going from August of calendar year ݐ through July of calendar 
year ݐ ൅ 1. 
Rank and size of doctoral programs. Program rankings are based on the average rating of 
the scholarly quality of program faculty in National Research Council assessments of doctoral 
programs in 1981 and 1993 (Jones, Lindzey, and Coggeshall 1982a, 1982b; Goldberger, Maher, 
and Flattau 1995).12  Size is based on enrollment of doctoral students.  These assessments 
covered most of the PhD-granting programs in each discipline, and taken together the assessed 
programs represent about 90 percent of PhDs granted in a field.  For each year, the rankings used 
in this analysis are the percentile ranks of the average ratings within fields. 
Rank and size are assigned to students based on their institution, field, and year of 
graduate entry. In departments assessed in both 1981 and 1993, the 1981 rank (size) is used for 
students who entered in 1981 or earlier, the 1993 rank (size) is used for students who entered in 
1993 or later, and a weighted average of the two ranks (sizes) is used for students who entered 
between 1982 and 1992. In departments assessed in 1981 only, the 1981 rank (size) is used for 
students who entered in 1987 or earlier; students in later entry cohorts are considered to be in 
programs that were not assessed.  In departments assessed in 1993 only, the 1993 rank (size) is 
used for students who entered in 1987 or later; students in earlier entry cohorts are considered to 
be in programs that were not assessed. 
12 The National Research Council also conducted an assessment in 2005, but I do not use measures from that 
assessment because the methodology was substantially different from the one used in the 1981 and 1993 
assessments (Ostriker et al. 2010). 
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For the regressions, program rank is parameterized using 10 categories (based on deciles 
of the distribution within field).  Program size is parameterized using three categories (less than 
50, 50 to 90, more than 90).  An indicator variable is used to identify students in programs that 
were not assessed. 
Job listings by field.
 Anthropology (1975–2005): American Anthropological Association (AAA).  Counts of job 
listings published monthly in Anthropology News (1975–2004) and online in the AAA Jobs 
Database (2001–2005). 
 Classics (1984–2004): American Philological Association (APA).  Annual counts of 
vacancies from APA placement reports for 2001 and 2004. 
 Economics (1979–2005): American Economic Association. “New jobs” series (academic 
plus non-academic) published annually in the May issue of American Economic Review (e.g., 
Siegfried 2001), based on listings in Job Openings for Economists.
 English (1975–2005): Modern Language Association (MLA).  Number of positions listed in 
the English Edition of the MLA Job Information List; counts from Table 1 of Fall 2004 MLA 
Newsletter.  Data for 2004 through 2006 are taken from Table 1 of the report “Trends in the 
MLA Job Information List, September 2007.” 
 History (1975–2005): American Historical Association (AHA).  Job openings advertised in 
Perspectives; counts based on AHA reports (2004 and 2005) and electronic data provided by 
AHA (1975–2003). 
 Philosophy (1982–2002): American Philosophical Association. Total number of jobs 
advertised in Jobs for Philosophers; data from pp. 130–131 of American Philosophical 
Association (2004). 
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 Political Science (1983–2005): American Political Science Association (APSA).  Data for 
1983 through 2003 are based on Brintnall (2005); data for 2004 and 2005 were provided by 
APSA. 
Unemployment rate.  National unemployment rate for civilian labor force age 16 and 
older. Rate for an academic year is computed as the average of monthly seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rates for August through July.  Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
State appropriations.  State appropriations per full-time-equivalent student are for all 
U.S. public universities and are expressed in constant (calendar year 2000) dollars.  Source: 
Grapevine database assembled by the Center for the Study of Education Policy at Illinois State 
University; see Rizzo (2006) for details.  Data used in Table 3 are for academic years 1975– 
1999. 
College expenditures.  College expenditures per full-time-equivalent student are for all 
U.S. public universities and are expressed in constant (calendar year 2000) dollars.  Expenditures 
are current educational and general expenditures, net of sponsored research.  Source: IPEDS, 
U.S. Department of Education; see Rizzo (2006) for details.  Data used in Table 3 are for 
academic years 1975–1999. 
Faculty salaries.  Faculty salaries are the average salary of full-time instructional faculty 
on nine-month contracts in degree-granting institutions and are expressed in constant (academic 
year 2005–06) dollars. Source: National Center for Education Statistics (2007), Table 240.  Data 
used in Table 3 are for selected academic years: 1975, 1978–1982, 1984–1985, 1987, 1989– 
1999, and 2001–2005. 
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